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INTRODUCTION
If the wind blows from the right direction in Amarillo, Texas, there is a
distinctive odor that the locals affectionately refer to as the “smell of
money.” The “smell” they are referring to originates from the manure at the
many cattle feedlots southwest of town, a major industry in the Texas
Panhandle. 1 This aroma has reached all the way to Washington D.C. In
April of 2017, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling that
encumbered these feedlots with regulatory uncertainty—a place no
regulated industry wants to be. 2 While confined animal feeding operations
(CAFOs) are normally exempt from federal environmental regulations, in
Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA the CAFOs were unable to sidestep the D.C.
Circuit’s application of two federal statutes. 3
Under Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA, CAFOs, such as the Panhandle
feedlots, are required by federal law to report to national, state, and local
emergency agencies if their operations release a certain amount of
hazardous substances in a twenty-four hour period. 4 While CAFOs do emit
1.

Amarillo Magazine, Reason No. 8: Because we Live in the Beef Capital of the World,
(Feb. 22, 2013, 8:14 PM) http://amarillo.com/national/2013-02-22/reason-no-8because-we-live-beef-capital-world [https://perma.cc/79CF-2R5Y].
2.
See Waterkeeper All. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 853 F.3d 527, 537–38 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(holding that the EPA acted erroneously when exempting CAFOs from environmental reporting
requirements for notice of hazardous substance releases).
3.
See e.g., Linda M. Thompson, A Breath of Fresh Air: Methods and Obstacles for
Achieving Air Pollution Reduction in Washington Factory Farm Communities, 1 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 130, 141–49 (2011) (discussing various federal environmental statutes and exemptions for
CAFOs).
4.
Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 535–36.
AMARILLO.COM
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hazardous substances (ammonia and hydrogen sulfide), there is a catch22—the EPA does not know how to accurately estimate or measure these
emissions. 5 The Waterkeeper Alliance decision was originally stayed until
May 1, 2018, meaning that AFO operators who failed to report when the
stay was lifted would risk potential lawsuits from environmental groups and
civil penalties. 6 However, on March 23, 2018, Congress enacted the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, (“Omnibus Bill”) which exempts
the reporting of “air emissions from animal waste at farms.” 7 The inclusion
of this exemption in this legislation has been seen as a massive victory for
the agriculture industry. 8
While the Omnibus Bill may now provide CAFOs with a shield from
reporting requirements, this article reviews the history behind production
agriculture’s air emissions regulation challenges and why this issue still
matters moving forward. Part I provides an overview of today’s modern
animal agricultural industry, looking at how CAFOs have grown in size in
recent years and the potential air pollution issues that stem from that
growth. Part II analyzes the current state of federal air emissions regulations
impacting CAFOs, focusing on the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). 9 Part III examines
the EPA’s final rule from 2008 that exempted CAFOs from the reporting
requirements under CERCLA, and the Agency’s reasons for this
exemption. 10 Part IV reviews Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA, the D.C.
Circuit’s recent decision that vacated the EPA’s 2008 final rule and requires
CAFOs to comply with the reporting requirements under both CERCLA
and EPCRA. 11 Part V discusses the aftermath of the Waterkeeper Alliance
decision, the EPA’s attempt at providing guidance for the agriculture
industry to comply with the rule, and Congress’s eleventh hour action that
5.
Id. at 531.
6.
CERCLA and EPCRA Reporting Requirements for Air Releases of Hazardous
Substances
from
Animal
Waste
at
Farms,
ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY
https://www.epa.gov/epcra/cercla-and-epcra-reporting-requirements-air-releases-hazardous-substancesanimal-waste-farms [https://perma.cc/D8X5-SAD6] (last updated Aug. 30, 2018) [hereinafter EPA,
CERCLA/EPCRA 2018 GUIDANCE DOCUMENT].
7.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
8.
Burt Rutherford, Trump Signs Omnibus Spending Bill, Ag Approves, BEEF (Mar. 23,
2018) http://www.beefmagazine.com/business/trump-signs-omnibus-spending-bill-ag-approves
[https://perma.cc/CA2F-KP3S].
9.
Comprehensive Environmental. Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9603 (2012);
Emergency
Planning
and
Community
Right-to-Know
Act,
42 U.S.C. § 11004 (2010).
10.
CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for Air Releases of Hazardous
Substances from Animal Waste at Farms, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,948, 76,948 (Dec. 18, 2008).
11.
Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 537–38.
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provides CAFOs with an exemption from reporting. 12 Finally, Part VI
considers the questions and options moving forward for the agriculture
industry in the wake of these air emissions decisions.
I. OVERVIEW OF TODAY’S MODERN ANIMAL AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY
A. The Development of the CAFO
Over the past half-century there has been a notable shift in Americans’
connection with the production of the food they consume. 13 Historically,
agricultural production has been land and “labor intensive, [taking] place on
many small, diversified farms in rural areas where more than half of the
U.S. population lived.” 14 In contrast, today’s agricultural production
industry consists of a smaller number of larger, more “specialized farms in
rural areas where less than a fourth of the U.S. population lives.” 15 In 2012,
less than one percent of the U.S. population participated in agriculture. 16
Yet, as the number of individuals who raise and grow our nation’s food and
fiber have decreased, modern agricultural production practices have
allowed the livestock agriculture industry to remain a significant portion of
the U.S. economy. 17 The average size of livestock production operations
increased in the aggregate because of the expanded use of technologies,
growing international demand, and vertical integration within species
production. 18
These more modern and larger scale livestock feeding operations, such
as feedlots, dairies, and commercial pork and poultry farms, are generally
12.
13.

EPA, CERCLA/EPCRA 2018 GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 6.
See generally INST. OF MED. AND NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, A FRAMEWORK FOR
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF THE FOOD SYSTEM 32, 42 (Malden C. Nesheim et al. eds., 2015) (discussing
shifts in agricultural practices in the last 50 years); Michelle B. Nowlin, Sustainable Production of
Swine: Putting Lipstick on a Pig, 37 Vt. L. Rev. 1079, 1081–83 (2013) (providing an overview of the
evolution of production agriculture); Linda M. Thompson, supra note 3, at 130, 132 (describing the
change in agricultural production techniques since World War II).
14.
Farming and Farm Income, ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC.,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-the-essentials/farming-andfarm-income/ [https://perma.cc/CB9M-KVET] (last updated Aug. 30, 2018).
15.
Id.
16.
See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ACH12-3, FARM DEMOGRAPHICS (2014)
https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/Farm_Demographics/
[https://perma.cc/QE7U-KPLA] (stating there were 3.2 million farmers in the United States in May
2014); U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/
[https://perma.cc/4HZX-GDFM] (last visited July 24, 2018) (stating that the estimated total U.S.
population was 318 million in May 2014).
17.
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIR EMISSIONS FROM ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS:
CURRENT KNOWLEDGE, FUTURE NEEDS 26 (2003) (discussing the role of livestock agriculture as a
driver of the agricultural economy).
18.
Id. at 29–30.
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referred to as AFOs. An AFO is defined as an operation that “(1) raise[s]
animals in a confined situation for a total of 45 days or more during a 12month period and (2) brings feed to the animals rather than having the
animals graze or seek feed in pastures and fields or on rangeland.” 19 Today,
there are “approximately 450,000 AFOs in the United States.” 20 CAFOs are
simply larger AFOs. 21 The EPA defines a CAFO as an operation that
houses over “1000 head of beef cattle, 700 dairy cows, 2500 swine
weighing more than 55 [pounds], 125 thousand broiler chickens, or 82
thousand laying hens or pullets[] confined on site for more than 45 days
during the year.” 22
B. Sources of Pollution from CAFOs
Unlike other industries, agricultural operations have traditionally been
exempted under numerous federal environmental laws. 23 Both state and
federal governments have tended to spend most of their efforts regulating
polluters that are more visible—“factories, waste treatment plants, motor
vehicles—than on smaller and more dispersed sources such as farms.” 24 In
addition (and unlike the aforementioned sources of pollution), the majority
of CAFOs are open-air systems, which makes monitoring and measuring
actual releases of pollutants into the environment extremely difficult. 25
Also, air emissions that stem from livestock and poultry production “are
generally more complex than those from industrial sources because of the
numerous biological processes involved.” 26

19.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. GAO-08-944 CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS: EPA NEEDS MORE INFORMATION AND A CLEARLY DEFINED STRATEGY TO PROTECT AIR
AND WATER QUALITY FROM POLLUTANTS OF CONCERN 1 (2008) [hereinafter GOA-08-944] (citing to
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b) (2017)).
20.
NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS,
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/plantsanimals/livestock/afo/
[https://perma.cc/LXJ2-QE5V] [hereinafter AFOs] (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
21.
GOA-08-944, supra note 19.
AFOs, supra note 20.
22.
23.
See generally J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law,
27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 267 (2000) (“Congress has actively …[decided] to exclude farms and farming
from the burdens of federal environmental law.”).
24.
CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RES. SERV., RL 32948, AIR QUALITY ISSUES AND
ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: A PRIMER 7 (2014) [hereinafter COPELAND, PRIMER].
25.
N.A. COLE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC., AUDITING AND ASSESSING AIR QUALITY IN
CONCENTRATED FEEDING OPERATIONS 2 (2008), (“Measuring atmospheric emissions is difficult and
entails 2 major challenges: 1) measuring the concentration; and 2) estimating the flux to the atmosphere
based on direct measurement or on a flux model that describes or simulate the turbulent dispersion of
gases and particulates.”).
26.
Id. at 4.
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However, as CAFOs grow in size, the concern of their potential adverse
effects on the environment grows as well, leading many to argue that
CAFOs should be subject to environmental regulation. 27 For many years,
the primary focus on environmental impacts from CAFOs has been on
protecting water resources under the Clean Water Act (CWA). 28 However,
the potential effects of livestock operations on air quality are an area of
growing concern. Air emissions from CAFOs include dust, odor, airborne
pathogens, ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, particulate matter, volatile organic
compounds, and greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as methane and carbon
dioxide. 29 Quantifying livestock emissions is difficult as they vary
tremendously from operation to operation. 30 These variations are a result of
differences in animals’ digestive systems [e.g., monogastric digestion in
swine versus ruminant digestion in cattle], the diets fed [e.g., forages versus
grains], and manure handling and storage. 31
Considering that CAFOs raise a large number of animals in a confined
area, they produce and must manage a large amount of manure. 32 “Manure”
is a broadly defined term that includes any combination of fecal matter,
urine, and other materials that are mixed with manure, such as bedding
material, excess feed, or wash water, and may be in a solid or liquid state.33
Furthermore, the state of the manure often dictates the management
practices and the degree that pollutants are emitted. 34 Solid manure is
typically stored in uncovered storage stockpiles, which exhibit emissions
from both aerobic and anaerobic processes over time. 35 Liquid manure is
usually stored in earthen impoundments (e.g., anaerobic lagoons). 36
Emissions from these storage sites will depend primarily on the length of
the storage period and temperature of the manure. 37 The most common use
27.
See, e.g., MEGAN STUBBS, CONG. RES. SERV., R41622, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
AGRICULTURE 2 (2014) (identifying environmental groups as a party expressing support for
regulation to protect public health and the environment).
28.
CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RES. SERV., RL 31851, ANIMAL WASTE AND WATER
QUALITY: EPA REGULATION OF CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS (CAFOS) 5 (2010)
(explaining that EPA regulations under the CWA have defined CAFOs as point sources subject to CWA
permitting requirements).
29.
COLE ET AL., supra note 25, at 1.
Id.
30.
31.
Id. at 4.
32.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 19, at 18.
33.
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(5) (2017).
34.
COLE ET AL, supra note 25, at 4.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NON-WATER QUALITY IMPACT ESTIMATES FOR ANIMAL
35.
FEEDING OPERATIONS 1-2, 1-10 (2002), https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/cafo_nonwaterquality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/44J8-WVD6].
36.
Id.; see also Nowlin, supra note 13, at 1084 (describing the function and design of the
lagoons).
37.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 35, at 1-2.
AND
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of collected manure after storage is as a fertilizer source on cropland and
pastures. 38
C. Air Emissions of Ammonia and Hydrogen Sulfide from Animal Waste
Under current federal environmental regulations, the “hazardous”
substances that may be emitted from CAFOs and trigger federal oversight
are ammonia and hydrogen sulfide. 39 Before discussing the statutory
schemes that require CAFOs to report releases of these sources, the next
subsections examine the biological processes that form both substances.
The biological processes are essential to understand the potential difficulty
of measuring, managing, and minimizing these greenhouse gas emissions.
1. Ammonia
Ammonia is a colorless gas that has a very noticeable odor at
concentrations above 50 ppm. 40 Various industries (fertilizer and coke
manufacturing, fossil fuel combustion, and refrigeration methods) are
known to emit ammonia; however, the EPA estimates that animal
agriculture accounts for 50 to 85 percent of total man-made ammonia
volatilization in the United States. 41 Although livestock facilities can
generate odors that may be offensive to neighboring residents, the EPA
states that ammonia odors are not toxic to humans. 42
Nitrogen, a constituent of crude protein in feedstuffs, is excreted in the
urine and feces of livestock and poultry in the form of urea, uric acid,
ammonia, and organic nitrogen. 43 Urea and uric acid are converted to
ammonia almost immediately after they are excreted; this volatilization
continues throughout the manure handling, storage, and land application. 44
Ammonia can be emitted from animal housing, open dry lots, stockpiles,
lagoons, and land applications of manure as a fertilizer source. 45 The
38.
NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., Animal Manure
Management,
(Dec.
1995)
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/technical/nra/rca/?cid=nrcs143_014211
[https://perma.cc/2PNT-ELPS].
39.
40 C.F.R. § 116.4 (2017).
40.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Pub. No. EPA-456/R-95-002, Control and Pollution Prevention
Options for Ammonia Emissions 1 (1995).
41.
SUSAN W. GAY & KATHARINE F. KNOWLTON, VA. COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, PUB.
NO. 442-110, AMMONIA EMISSIONS AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE 1 (2009).
42.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 40, at 43.
43.
GAY & KNOWLTON, supra note 41, at 3.
44.
COLE ET AL, supra note 25, at 4.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 35, at 1-2.
45.
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concentrated ammonia emissions may be affected by many factors,
“including diet (protein quantity and degradability, carbohydrate
degradability, acid-base balance), pen surface, retention pond, or lagoon
conditions (total ammonia concentration, pH, temperature, moisture,
solids), weather, ventilation rate, manure storage method, and animal
age.” 46
While odor complaints may be a common issue with ammonia
emissions, more pressing are the potential negative impacts for the
environment. Atmospheric ammonia that travels via wind patterns may
become a nutrient source when it is deposited onto neighboring soils and
water bodies. 47 In ecologically sensitive areas, such as a water body with a
high concentration of phosphorus, ammonia deposits may provide an
oversupply of nitrogen for the native flora, resulting in potentially
deleterious modifications of the native ecosystem. 48
2. Hydrogen Sulfide
Hydrogen sulfide is a colorless gas that is known for a distinctive
“rotten egg” smell. 49 Human industrial sources responsible for the release
of hydrogen sulfide include: wastewater treatment plants, landfills, kraft
paper mills, petroleum refineries, natural gas plants, coke ovens, and food
processing plants. 50 Hydrogen sulfide emissions from CAFOs occur as a
result of the fermentation “by sulfate-reducing bacteria” in manure
managed as liquids or slurries. 51 Sulfur is a common ingredient in animal
diets (sulfur amino acids contained in the feed and inorganic sulfur
compounds from trace mineral supplements), and manure that is stored in a
liquid state magnifies the emissions because of the pH, temperature, and
biological oxygen demand. 52
Hydrogen sulfide emissions from lagoons and retention ponds “occur
episodically when sufficient hydrogen sulfide gas, produced from nutrients
or sludge on the bottom of the pond, accumulates to overcome the surface
tension of the water and rise to the pond surface.” 53 As noted above, the
46.
COLE, supra note 25, at 5.
47.
GAY & KNOWLTON, supra note 41, at 2.
48.
COLE ET AL, supra note 25, at 4–5; see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 132
(discussing the harmful effects ammonia has on aquatic life).
49.
Thompson, supra note 3, at 132–33; AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE
REGISTRY, DEP’T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., PUBLIC HEALTH STATEMENT: HYDROGEN SULFIDE
(2016).
50.
AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, supra note 49.
51.
COLE ET AL, supra note 25, at 5.
Id.
52.
53.
Id.
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emission rates appear to be greater from facilities that store manure in a
liquid state than from open-air management, such as methods used in
feedyard pens. 54 Unlike ammonia, the biggest concern with hydrogen
sulfide is not the potential for deleterious impacts on the environment;
rather, it is the more localized risk of human exposure to toxic
concentrations. 55
3. Greenhouse Gases
Due to the current state of federal regulations, this article focuses on
ammonia and hydrogen sulfide emissions from CAFOs; however, a brief
discussion on greenhouse gas emissions, specifically methane, from CAFOs
may be helpful. As climate change science and awareness “heats up,”
understanding the sources of GHGs (e.g., carbon dioxide, methane, and
nitrous oxide) are important. In 2015, animal agriculture accounted for over
30% of man-made sources of methane emissions in the United States—
enteric fermentation (25% of total methane emissions) and manure
management (9% of total methane emissions). 56 Given the large percentage
of emissions that animal agriculture is responsible for, some argue that
methane emissions from CAFOs should be regulated. 57 While some of this
methane is a byproduct of ruminant digestion (enteric fermentation), like
ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, GHGs are also emitted from the
decomposition of manure. 58 Part VI of this paper details practices (such as
improvements in manure storage facilities or diet modifications) that may
be used to reduce ammonia and hydrogen sulfide emissions from CAFOs.
Perhaps future regulation of GHGs coming from CAFOs, specifically
including increased requirements for manure management, may create
parallel opportunities for the reduction of ammonia and hydrogen sulfide
emissions. 59
54.
COLE ET AL, supra note 25, at 5.
55.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 35, at 1-4 (stating that manure as a liquid or slurry
has the potential to emit hydrogen sulfide under anaerobic conditions); see also AGENCY FOR TOXIC
SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, supra note 49 (emphasizing the risk of human exposure versus
environmental harms).
56.
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-P-17-001, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2015, ES-6, ES-14 to -15 (2017) (dividing the total methane
emissions by emissions from manure management).
57.
See e.g., John Verheul, Note, Methane As a Greenhouse Gas: Why the EPA Should
Regulate Emissions from Animal Feeding Operations and Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
Under the Clean Air Act, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163, 165 (2011) (arguing that in light of climate
change, the EPA should regulate methane emissions from AFOs and CAFOs).
58.
COPELAND, PRIMER, supra note 24, at 2.
59.
See, e.g., Jordi Domingo et al., Comm. on Agric. and Rural Dev., Measures at Farm
Level to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from EU Agriculture, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 513.997, at 31
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II. CURRENT REGULATION OF CAFOS UNDER FEDERAL AIR EMISSIONS
STANDARDS
For the most part, current federal environmental law is not well suited
to regulate air emissions from agricultural activities. The Clean Air Act
(CAA) provides a comprehensive framework for regulating stationary and
mobile sources of air pollution. 60 The CAA focuses on “controlling ‘major
sources’ that emit more than threshold quantities of regulated pollutants.” 61
However, because air emission quantities from CAFOs are either not the
category of pollutant covered by the CAA or do not emit enough to trigger
permitting requirements, they generally are not regulated under the CAA. 62
However, agriculture does not completely fly under the radar. Two
provisions of federal law, sections of CERCLA and EPCRA, both require
reporting whenever a certain quantity of a hazardous substance is released
into the environment. 63 At first glance, one might assume that these statutes
only handle the cleanup of hazardous waste that is radioactive or from lead
smelters and mining operations. However, importantly for CAFOs, the EPA
has classified both ammonia and hydrogen sulfide as hazardous or
reportable substances under both CERCLA and EPCRA with the reportable
quantity (RQ) for each at 100 pounds per day. 64
A. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act
CERCLA authorizes “federal cleanup of releases of hazardous
substances, pollutants, or contaminants that may present an imminent and
substantial danger to the public health or welfare . . . and impos[es] strict
liability for cleanup and damages to natural resources from releases of
hazardous substances.” 65 A facility that releases certain hazardous
substances must provide notification of these releases to the National
Response Center (NRC) if the release exceeds the substance’s RQ. 66
Specifically, CERCLA requires that:

(Jan. 2014) (offering regulatory recommendations for manure management focused on reducing
methane and ammonia).
60.
COPELAND, PRIMER, supra note 24, at 9.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 16.
64.
40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2017); 40 C.F.R. § 355 app. A (2017).
65.
COPELAND, PRIMER, supra note 24, at 17.
66.
42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2012).
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Any person in charge of . . . an onshore facility shall, as soon as he
has knowledge of any release (other than a federally permitted
release) of a hazardous substance from such . . . facility in
quantities equal to or greater than those determined pursuant to
section 9602 of this title, immediately notify the National Response
Center. . . . 67
Of note, CERCLA does provide exclusions for “the normal application of
fertilizer” from the definition of release.68
B. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
Congress enacted EPCRA in 1986 as part of the amendments to
CERCLA, and this statute “establishes a framework of state, regional and
local agencies designed to inform the public about the presence of
hazardous and toxic chemicals, and to provide for emergency response in
the event of health-threatening release.” 69 Like CERCLA, EPCRA requires
the owner or operator of a facility to report to state and local authorities and
emergency responders any releases greater than the RQ of substances
deemed hazardous under CERCLA or extremely hazardous under
EPCRA. 70 Hydrogen sulfide and ammonia are hazardous substances under
EPCRA with RQs of 100 pounds per day. 71 Additionally, EPCRA also
excludes from the definition of hazardous chemicals any substance that is
“used in routine agricultural operations.” 72
C. Continuous Releases Under CERCLA and EPCRA
Both CERCLA and EPCRA allow for reduced reporting requirements
for “continuous releases” of hazardous substances that exceed the RQ. 73
This is important for CAFOs, as it alleviates the requirement for potential
daily notification to the NRC and state and local authorities into an annual
reporting system. 74 The EPA defines a continuous release of a hazardous
67.
Id.
68.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)(D) (2012).
69.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 86 (1998).
70.
42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
71.
40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2017).
72.
42 U.S.C. § 11021(e)(5) (2012).
73.
42 U.S.C. § 9603(f)(2) (stating that no additional notification of release is required as
long as the release is continuous, stable, and the facility has already given notification of the initial
release of the substance).
74.
See 40 C.F.R. § 302.8(a) (2017) (explaining that no notification is required for
continuous releases).
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substance as one “that is continuous and stable in quantity and rate.” 75 The
EPA interprets “continuous” to mean a “release that occurs without
interruption or abatement that is routine, anticipated, and intermittent
during normal operation or treatment process.” 76 Furthermore, the term
“stable in quantity and rate” means “predictable and regular in amount and
rate of emission.” 77
D. Enforcement and Potential Liabilities Under CERCLA and EPCRA
Both CERCLA and EPRCA contain provisions that empower the EPA
to assess civil penalties (up to $27,500 per day) if releases that exceed the
RQ go unreported. 78 The EPA has used these provisions against AFOs in at
least two separate cases. 79 In 2001, the EPA and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) entered into a civil settlement with two large Missouri pork
producers, Premium Standard Farms, Inc., and Continental Grain Company,
Inc., for alleged CWA, CAA, CERCLA, and EPCRA violations. 80 Five
years later, in 2006, the EPA and DOJ entered into a similar consent decree
with Seaboard Foods LP and PIC USA, Inc., pork producers with
operations in Oklahoma, Kansas, Texas, and Colorado. 81 In this settlement,
Seaboard was required to pay a civil penalty of $205,000 for failing to
comply with the CWA, CAA, CERCLA, and EPCRA. 82
These statutes also allow for enforcement through citizen lawsuits,
permitting “any person to commence a civil action against” either the entity
who violates the reporting requirement or against the EPA for failure to
enforce the requirement. 83 The Sierra Club successfully brought lawsuits

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
40 C.F.R. § 302.8(b).
Id.
CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33691, ANIMAL WASTE AND
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES: CURRENT LAWS AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 2 (2014) (hereinafter COPELAND,
LAWS AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES).
79.
Id. at 3.
80.
See Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nation’s Second Largest Hog Producer
Reaches
Settlement
with
U.S.
&
Citizen’s
Group
(Nov.
20,
2001),
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/reference-news-release-nations-second-largest-hog-producer-reachessettlement-us [https://perma.cc/37TE-T9EV] (describing that the two companies violated the CAA and
CWA as well as other laws that may include CERCLA and EPCRA).
81.
Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Government Reaches Settlements with Seaboard
Foods
and
PIC
USA
(Sept.
15,
2006),
https://archive.epa.gov/epapages/newsroom_archive/newsreleases/3933bb91f85c53fd852571ea0059b7f
4.html [https://perma.cc/MW5L-DMKV].
82.
Id.
83.
COPELAND, LAWS AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES, supra note 78, at 2–3.
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under the citizen suit provisions against Tyson Foods in 2003 and against
Seaboard Farms in 2004. 84
III. THE 2008 EXEMPTION FOR CAFOS
The poultry industry petitioned the EPA in 2005 to create an exemption
for agricultural operations from the reporting requirements under EPCRA
and CERCLA; they claimed these releases of ammonia and hydrogen
sulfide posed “little or no risk to public health, while reporting imposes an
undue burden on the regulated community and government responders.” 85
In response to this petition, the EPA released a proposal in December 2007
to exempt CAFOs from reporting under both statutes. 86 The EPA,
supported by the agriculture industry and government responders, reasoned
that CERCLA and EPCRA’s “reports are unnecessary because, in most
cases, a federal response is impractical and unlikely.” 87 In making this
determination, the EPA “considered whether the Agency would ever take a
response action, as a result of such notification, for releases of hazardous
substances to the air that meet or exceed their RQ from animal waste at
farms.” 88 The EPA detailed that at the time of rulemaking, the EPA had
“not initiated a response to any NRC notifications of ammonia, hydrogen
sulfide, or any other hazardous substances released to the air where animal
waste at farms is the source of that release.” 89 Moreover, the EPA could
“not foresee a situation where the Agency would initiate a response action
as a result of such notification.” 90
However, in response to the large number of comments “expressing the
desire to receive information regarding releases from large . . . (CAFOs),”
the EPA amended the proposed rule to only exempt reporting under
CERCLA and certain livestock facilities under EPCRA. 91 Under EPCRA,
the EPA exempted farms that release hazardous substances from animal
waste to the air that meet or exceed their RQ from reporting under section
84.
Sierra Club v. Tyson Foods, F. Supp.2d 693, 693 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (holding that farms
are not exempt from reporting requirements under CERCLA and EPCRA); Sierra Club v. Seaboard
Farms Inc., 387 F.3d 1167, 1176 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the term “facility” as used in CERCLA’s
§ 101(9)(A) and (B) encompasses the farm as a whole and does not refer to individual barns or lagoons
on the property).
85.
COPELAND, LAWS AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES, supra note 78, at 4.
86.
Id. at 5; Thompson, supra note 3, at 147.
87.
CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for Air Releases of Hazardous
Substances from Animal Waste at Farms, 73 Fed. Reg. 76, 948, 76,956.
88.
Id. at 76,953.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 76,950.
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304 if the farms stable or confine less than a certain number of animal
species. 92 Any CAFO that housed more than these numbers had to report. 93
The EPA’s Final Rule became effective in January 2009 and exempted
agricultural operations that annually sell at least $1,000 of agricultural
products from CERCLA reporting requirements for releases of hazardous
substances to the air from animal waste. 94 In addition, the Final Rule
provided that any farms already participating and in compliance with the
EPA’s Animal Feeding Operation Air Compliance Agreement 95 were
exempt from reporting requirements. 96
IV. WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE V. EPA
The ink barely had time to dry on the EPA’s Final Rule before it
was challenged. 97 Several environmental groups, including Waterkeeper
Alliance, Sierra Club, the Humane Society of the United States,
Environmental Integrity Project, and the Center for Food Safety
(collectively “Waterkeeper Alliance”), challenged that neither CERCLA
nor EPCRA permitted the EPA to grant reporting exemptions. 98 Rather,
Waterkeeper Alliance argued that both statutes required a report anytime
there was a release that exceeded the RQ and that the Final Rule was
arbitrarily treating animal waste from CAFOs more favorably than those
from other industries. 99
The D.C. Circuit Court, using a Chevron analysis to interpret the Final
Rule, found that the EPA unreasonably interpreted CERCLA and EPCRA’s

92.
Id. at 76,952 (showing the thresholds for exemption from EPCRA section 304
reporting that “(1)700 mature dairy cows, whether milked or dry; (2) 1,000 veal calves; (3) 1,000 cattle
other than mature dairy cows or veal calves. Cattle includes but is not limited to heifers, steers, bulls and
cow/calf pairs; (4) 2,500 swine each weighing 55 pounds or more; (5) 10,000 swine each weighing less
than 55 pounds; (6) 500 horses; (7) 10,000 sheep or lambs; (8) 55,000 turkeys; (9) 30,000 laying hens or
broilers, if the farm uses a liquid manure handling system; (10) 125,000 chickens (other than laying
hens), if the farm uses other than liquid manure handling system; (11) 82,000 laying hens, if the farm
uses other than a liquid manure handling system; (12) 30,000 ducks (if the farm uses other than a liquid
manure handling system); (13) 5,000 ducks (if the farm uses a liquid manure handling system)”).
93.
Id. at 76,953–54.
94.
Id. at 76,956.
95.
Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. 4,958
(Jan. 31, 2005).
96.
EPA, CERCLA/EPCRA Reporting Requirements for Air Releases of Hazardous
Substances from Animal Waste at Farms, supra note 6.
97.
See Waterkeeper All. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 853 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(discussing that the EPA was immediately sued by environmental groups after issuing a final rule that
generally exempted farms from reporting requirements under CERCLA and EPCRA).
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 532.
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requirements in creating the Final Rule. 100 Reading the statutes together, the
court found that the statutory provisions set forth a straightforward
reporting requirement for any non-exempt release. 101 The EPA and
agricultural industry intervenors argued that the EPA was exercising its de
minimis power, maintaining that the Final Rule “minimize[s] the burden on
both regulated entities and government response agencies.” 102
In analyzing the use of the de minimis doctrine, the court reiterated that
the doctrine cannot be used “to create an exception where application of the
literal terms would provide benefits, in the sense of furthering the
regulatory objectives, but the agency concludes that the acknowledged
benefits are exceeded by the costs.” 103 While the court recognized the
importance of efficiency—it was concerned with the cost and burden on
both the regulated and governmental agencies—Congress did not provide
any reasons under the statute that allowed an agency to create such an
exemption as included in the Final Rule. 104 Furthermore, even though the
EPA “could ‘not foresee a situation where the Agency would initiate a
response action as a result of such notification,’” the court accepted the
concerns that commenters made during the EPA’s rulemaking process:
They put before the EPA a good deal of information . . . suggesting
scenarios where the reports could be quite helpful in fulfilling the
statutes’ goals. Specifically, commenters explained that when
[manure] pits are agitated for pumping, hydrogen sulfide, methane,
and ammonia are rapidly released from the manure and may reach
toxic levels or displace oxygen, increasing the risk to humans and
livestock. 105
While the court acknowledged the possibility that these risks could be
outweighed by the substantial costs estimated by the EPA, the court
ultimately concluded that these comments undermined the primary purpose
of the “Final Rule—namely, that notifications of animal waste-related
releases serve no regulatory purpose because it would be ‘impractical or
unlikely’ to respond to such a release.” 106
100.
Id. at 534 (citing to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837(1984)).
101.
Id.at 535.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. (citing Ala. Power v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360–61 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
104.
Waterkeeper All., 853 F 3d. at 535 (citing 73 Fed. Reg. at 76,958).
105.
Id. (citing 73 Fed. Reg. at 76,957/2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106.
Id. at 537 (citing 73 Fed. Reg. at 76,950/1).
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In sum, the court ruled to vacate the Final Rule “[b]ecause the EPA’s
action [was not] justified either as a reasonable interpretation of any
statutory ambiguity or implementation of a de minimus exception.” 107
V. AFTERMATH OF THE WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE V. EPA DECISION
The Waterkeeper Alliance decision sent shock waves across the
agricultural industry after it was released in April 2017. 108 The court
granted the EPA’s motion to stay the ruling until May 1, 2018, in order to
allow the EPA time to develop guidance documents to assist CAFOs across
the country in understanding the new reporting requirements under
CERCLA. 109
On May 25, 2017, 28 U.S. Senators sent a letter to EPA Administrator
Scott Pruitt asking him to challenge the D.C. Circuit’s opinion and “to
provide America’s farmers and ranchers with regulatory relief through
agency directive and rulemaking.” 110 In this letter, the Senators said that,
“left unchecked,” the expanded reporting requirement resulting from
Waterkeeper Alliance means that “up to 100,000 farms and ranches across
the country will face enormous uncertainty and potential liability if they do
not submit an emissions report.” 111
On October 26, 2017, the EPA released guidance documents to assist
agricultural operations with understanding the reporting requirements under
CERCLA. 112 The stay on the D.C. Circuit’s ruling was set to end on
November 14, 2017, meaning that any agricultural operation that may fall
under CERCLA would need to comply with the reporting requirements by
that deadline or face the uncertain potential for civil lawsuits and fines
under the statute. 113 The reports require good-faith estimates of the

107.
Id.
108.
CAFOs Ordered to Report Hazardous Pollution, WATERKEEPER ALL. (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://waterkeeper.org/cafos-ordered-to-report-hazardous-pollution/
[https://perma.cc/8J5B-9NWK]
(explaining how the decision closed a loophole in reporting requirements).
109.
Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Releases Guidance on Reporting Air
Emissions of Hazardous Substances from Animal Waste at Farms (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-releases-guidance-reporting-air-emissions-hazardous-substancesanimal-waste-farms [https://perma.cc/K6BK-AUHP]; see also EPA, CERCLA/EPCRA 2018 GUIDANCE
DOCUMENT, supra note 6 (explaining that the court extended the extended the stay until May 1, 2018).
110.
Press Release, Miss. Senator Urges Appeal of D.C. Circuit Decision That Would
Create Undue Burdens for America’s Farmers & Ranchers, Roger Wicker U. S. for Miss. (May 26,
2017),
https://www.wicker.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/5/wicker-opposes-senseless-epareporting-requirements-for-farmers [https://perma.cc/8ZGW-YWCL].
111.
Id.
112.
Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 109.
113.
EPA, CERCLA/EPCRA 2018 GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 6.
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reportable emissions and can be based on best professional judgment. 114
While agricultural operators are required to report, the EPA has given them
considerable discretion in determining how they estimate emission releases
from their operation. 115 Agricultural operators are encouraged to
“coordinate with . . . trade associations or . . . land-grant universities, [and]
may establish estimated quantities of releases by relying on: (1) past release
data, (2) engineering estimates, (3) your knowledge of the facility’s
operations and release history, or (4) your best professional judgment.” 116
Actual data on emissions from the individual operation is not required.117
On February 1, 2018, the D.C. Circuit granted the EPA’s motion to further
stay the mandate until May 1, 2018. 118 As a result, CAFOs would not be
required to submit their initial continuous release notifications until that
date. 119
For all the backlash, confusion, and anxiety, a little over a month before
the D.C. Circuit was set to vacate the 2008 Final Rule, Congress finally
stepped in. On March 23, 2018, President Trump signed the Omnibus Bill,
and tucked within this massive appropriations bill is Title XI, called the
“Fair Agricultural Reporting Method Act” or “FARM Act.” 120 The FARM
Act amends Section 103(e) of CERCLA to no longer apply to “air
emissions from animal waste (including decomposing animal waste) at a
farm.” 121 Animal waste includes “feces, urine, or other excrement, digestive
emission, urea, or similar substances emitted by animals (including any
form of livestock, poultry, or fish).” 122
VI. QUESTIONS AND OPTIONS MOVING FORWARD
While the eleventh-hour actions by Congress in passing the Omnibus
Bill have prevented CAFO operators from having to comply with reporting
requirements and potential penalties under CERCLA, the conflict between
environmental groups and a modern agriculture industry remains. 123
Congress may have saved the day on this matter, but Waterkeeper Alliance
is a good example of the predicament production agriculture is in for many
environmental issues. What might happen if Congress does not act as
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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quickly next time, or a different administration refuses to sign the bill? The
following will provide a look at some of the questions asked and options
available to the involved parties prior to the passage of the Omnibus Bill.
Following the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, the EPA was left with limited
options beyond its issuance of guidance for the agriculture industry, and the
aftermath of Waterkeeper Alliance left many questions unanswered. An
industry that enjoyed exemption for years went from blissful ignorance to
very quickly being told—via a red box on the EPA’s webpage—to report
emissions that the regulating agency is not sure how to measure. 124 Even
the best land-grant universities in the country could only provide estimates
for determining values. 125 Beyond the statutory requirements that our legal
system has said is the law, what does it actually mean to implement these
regulations? They add time and expense to agricultural operations and a
fear of litigation at some point in the future by an NGO or environmental
group that may disagree with modern production feeding operations.
Operators of CAFOs likely have two key questions regarding these laws:
first, what is the actual purpose behind these reporting requirements? And
second, how can they accurately and confidently determine whether an
operation emits an amount of ammonia or hydrogen sulfide that would
subject them to the reporting requirements?
A. Does Reporting Really Matter?
Even though the expert agency that manages both programs stated that
these “reports were unnecessary because, in most cases, a federal response
is impractical and unlikely,” the D.C. Circuit in Waterkeeper Alliance
seemed to defer to the Final Rule commenters, who expressed concern for
the possibility of these releases. 126 These commenters and proponents of
stricter air regulations on CAFOs put forward unfortunate cases where
farmers “have become seriously ill or even died” as the result of manure
(specifically when pumping liquid manure from pits) as evidence of the
need for the reporting. 127 As terrible as these cases are, agricultural groups
124.
Id.
125.
See id. (providing estimates of emissions based on studies from universities like Iowa
State University, Texas A&M University, and the University of Nebraska).
126.
CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for Air Releases of Hazardous
Substances from Animal Waste at Farms, 73 Fed. Reg. at 76,956; see also Waterkeeper All. v. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 853 F.3d 527, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (according great weight to the comments in the Final
Rule).
127.
Waterkeeper All. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 853 F.3d 527, 536 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also
J. Nicholas Hoover, Can’t You Smell That Smell? Clean Air Act Fixes for Factory Farm Air Pollution, 6
STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2013) (discussing a deadly event involving multiple people with
regards to a manure pit).
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may well be skeptical in looking for the actual reasons environmental
groups are pushing for these reports. Neither CERCLA nor EPCRA impose
actual reductions of emissions from hazardous substances; however,
because these statutes currently contain mechanisms that allow for citizen
suits against CAFOs, environmental groups may pursue lawsuits against
animal agriculture under the low-hanging fruit of these provisions with the
hopes of future implementation of broader CAA regulation of CAFOs. 128
The CAA has technology-forcing measures that would make CERCLA and
EPRCA reporting standards look easy. 129 While Congress has acted to
remove this burden for now, the potential for future regulation under other
environmental laws is something that is not overlooked by those opposed to
the exemption; rather, it may be argued that this legislation only delays “an
inevitable reckoning with pollution caused by [an] enormously consolidated
agricultural system.” 130
B. How to Accurately Measure Emissions
If CAFOs must report, how does a farmer or rancher accurately
determine if he or she is required to report? The short answer is that no one
is quite sure. Unfortunately for CAFOs, the lack of reliable science is not a
reason to exempt animal production facilities from the reporting
requirements of EPCRA and CERCLA. 131 Animal agriculture has
previously argued that “there is no generally accepted methodology or
model for estimating” an emission from CAFOs, but that argument was
unsuccessful. 132 Furthermore, neither party in Waterkeeper Alliance argued
that daily emissions of commercial farms fell below the reporting threshold
under both CERCLA and EPCRA. 133
128.
Danielle M. Purifoy, EPCRA: A Retrospective on the Environmental Right-to-Know
Act, 13 YALE J. OF HEALTH POL’Y 375, 377–78 (2013) (stating that beyond planning and reporting
requirements in EPCRA, “industries have no express obligations under the statute to mitigate releases or
to reduce risks to their employees and their surrounding communities. Nevertheless . . . this ‘toothless’
statute has been instrumental not only in improvements in industry transparency to its neighbors and the
larger public. Also, and perhaps unexpectedly, in increased self-policing by many industries of their
emissions, both to appease investment stakeholders and to prevent costly waste from inefficiencies at
their facilities.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (2012) (explaining the citizens suit provision of
CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (2012) (explaining the citizens suit provision of EPCRA).
129.
See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 667 (4th ed. 2016) (“The EPA regulates stationary sources through technology-based
emissions limitations.”).
130.
Laurie Ristino, Congress Just Gave Big Agriculture the Pollution Green Light, THE
HILL (Mar. 23, 2018, 02:20 PM) http://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/379971-congress-justgave-big-agriculture-the-pollution-green-light [https://perma.cc/2G7U-ESQD].
131.
Sierra Club, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 299 F.Supp.2d 693, 705 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
132.
Id. at 706.
133.
Waterkeeper All. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 853 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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Although the argument “we cannot measure it” may not fly in a D.C.
Circuit Court, understanding the difficulties of actually measuring
emissions in the feedlot or dairy over 1,600 miles away from benches in
Washington, D.C., is important. Uncertainty in accurately determining if
you may be subject to large fines and citizen suits is a serious matter facing
CAFO operators and managers across the country. The issue is not that the
CAFO managers cannot or refuse to do mathematical estimates. The
concern becomes whether the estimates are accurate, and accurately
estimating emissions is no easy task—the EPA has spent over eleven years
researching this very issue and still cannot provide a clear answer. 134
Likewise, states have, for the most part, avoided regulating CAFO
emissions for this very reason. 135
In order to better understand the difficulty of actually estimating these
emissions, a brief overview of the EPA’s attempts to quantify these air
components over the last ten years may be helpful. 136 In 2005, the EPA and
the dairy, swine, and poultry industries found some middle ground in which
they hoped to make progress with quantifying and reporting air emissions
by entering into a voluntary consent agreement known as the Animal
Feeding Operations Consent Agreement (the Air Compliance
Agreement). 137 The AFOs were seeking to address the recent lawsuits
brought under CERCLA and EPCRA, and the EPA needed funding and
cooperation from the agricultural industry to better develop the emissionsmeasuring methodologies. 138 Under this Air Compliance Agreement,
participating AFOs provided the funding for a two-year, nationwide
emissions-monitoring study (National Air Emissions Monitoring Study or
NAEMS) of animal confinement structures and manure storage and
treatment units in the broiler, egg-layer, swine, and dairy industries. 139 The
goal of this study was to gather accurate emissions data that the EPA could
use to develop emissions-estimating methodologies (EEMs). 140 Using these
estimates of daily and annual emissions would aid the EPA’s regulation of
134.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 17-P-0396, ELEVEN YEARS AFTER AGREEMENT, EPA
HAS NOT DEVELOPED RELIABLE EMISSION ESTIMATION METHODS TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANIMALS
FEEDING OPERATIONS COMPLY WITH CLEAN AIR ACT AND OTHER STATUTES 2 (2017).
135.
COPELAND, PRIMER, supra note 24, at 15.
136.
See Amanda Peterka, EPA Study of CAFO Emissions
Grinds
on
with
No
End
in
Sight,
E&E
NEWS
(June
25,
2014),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060001938 [https://perma.cc/T65M-4EQE] (“U.S. EPA’s nine-year
effort to document air pollution at livestock operations is likely still many years from completion and
unlikely to be as useful as industry and environmental groups had hoped.”).
137.
Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. 4,958,
4,959 (Jan. 31, 2005).
138.
Id. at 4,958, 4,963.
139.
Id. at 4,961.
140.
Id.
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AFOs under the CAA, CERCLA, and EPCRA. 141 Over 2,500 AFOs,
representing nearly 14,000 facilities, received the EPA’s approval to
participate in the Air Compliance Agreement. 142 Notably, all AFOs that
“chose to participate in the Air Compliance Agreement and [met] all its
conditions [received] . . . a limited release and covenant not to sue from
liability for certain past and ongoing CAA, CERCLA and EPCRA
violations.” 143 The Air Compliance Agreement raised over $14 million to
fund NAEMS. 144
With the EPA’s oversight and monitoring, NAEMS began in the
summer of 2006. 145 The study was implemented at 27 representative
broiler, egg-layer, swine, and dairy operations in ten states (California,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin). 146 Interestingly, beef production, which
accounts for the largest recoverable nitrogen percentage of all livestock and
poultry species, was markedly not represented in these studies. 147 In
February of 2012, the EPA released a draft version of the results from
NAEMS and asked the Science Advisory Board (SAB), a board made up of
some of the top scientists, engineers, and professors from universities all
across the country, to review and provide advice on scientific issues
associated with development of the EEMs. 148
In April of 2013, the SAB produced a review of the EEMs and
ultimately concluded that the EPA’s statistical models would have “a
limited ability to accurately predict emissions” beyond the small number of
farms in the dataset and that the “models used in the current EEMs were not
suitable for use outside the range of parameter values in the current
data.” 149 In July of 2013, the EPA responded to the SAB’s review and
stated that the EPA would continue to “work diligently in the coming
141.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-SAB-13-003, SAB REVIEW OF EMISSIONSESTIMATING METHODOLOGIES FOR BROILER ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND FOR LAGOONS AND
BASINS AT SWINE AND DAIRY ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 11 (2013), (describing that a limited
sample in developing EEMs may not be effective in controlling emissions more broadly).
142.
Id. at A-3.
143.
Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. at
4,959.
144.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 134, at 6.
145.
NAEMS: National Air Emissions Monitoring Study, PURDUE UNIVERSITY
https://engineering.purdue.edu/~odor/NAEMS/index.htm [https://perma.cc/SZ46-TA9P] (2006).
146.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 134, at 7.
147.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS – 2012 MONITORED
AFOs, 1 https://archive.epa.gov/airquality/afo2012/web/html/index.html [https://perma.cc/NTG9MGRG] (last updated on July 11, 2016) (identifying pork, broiler chickens, egg-laying operations, and
dairies as categories of animal feeding operations included the study, with the noticeable absence of beef
production).
148.
Id.; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SAB REVIEW OF EMISSION, supra note 141, at A-1.
149.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SAB REVIEW OF EMISSION, supra note 141, at 2.
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months to develop appropriate emissions-estimating methodologies for
animal-feeding operations throughout the U.S.” 150 This appears to be the
most recent update on this matter.
In sum, over ten years have passed since NAEMS began, and there still
appears to be challenges to determining the best way to accurately measure
emissions from CAFOs. 151 In defense of the EPA, the Agency has
diligently worked to find a solution to the emissions-measuring issues;
however, a reliable and accurate formula that can be applied to fit a certain
species, in a certain part of the country, fed a certain diet, and with a certain
manure-management system has yet to be found. 152 Because of this
uncertainty, the CERCLA rule that went into effect on January 22, 2018,
offers CAFOs a range of options in selecting a formula that fits them. 153
C. What Can Be Done in the Long Term with These Reporting
Requirements?
In analyzing the situation post-Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA, the
agricultural industry is at an important crossroads. “Two roads diverged in a
yellow wood” for production agriculture, and the path it decides to travel
down may very well impact its future regulatory burden, the future viability
of the industry, and its footprint on the environment. 154
1. Forced Regulation Through Litigation
This is the road that production agriculture is currently on.
Environmental groups, through expensive and time-consuming court cases,
have slowly chipped away at the exemptions that agriculture has enjoyed
under environmental regulations. 155 These groups are often active, well150.
Letter from Bob Perciasepe, Acting Admin., Envtl. Prot. Agency, to David T. Allen,
Science
Advisory
Bd.
(July
15,
2013),
Chairman,
https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/SABPRODUCT.NSF/81e39f4c09954fcb85256ead006be86e/08A7FD5F8B
D5D2FE85257B52004234FE/$File/EPA-SAB-13-003_Response_07-15-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9D95-SFC8].
151.
EPA, CERCLA/EPCRA 2018 GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 6 (“EPA recognizes
that it will be challenging for farmers to estimate releases from animal wastes because there is no
generally accepted methodology for estimating these emissions at this time.”).
152.
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funded, and not afraid of an agriculture industry that refuses to
acknowledge them as an opponent worth meddling with. However, but for
commenters who participated in the EPA’s rulemaking process for the 2008
Final Rule and cases like Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA, production
agriculture would likely still be exempt from reporting its emissions. 156
Furthermore, because the federal statutory scheme currently does not fit
these environmental groups’ goals in regard to regulating CAFOs, it is
likely they will continue to attempt to try to “fit a square emission into a
round regulation.” 157 Ammonia and hydrogen sulfide may just be the
beginning. While this paper has focused solely on these two pollutants,
enteric fermentation and manure management are two of the top four
sources of methane, a GHG, in the United States. 158 The next four years
may provide a short respite from new climate and environmental
regulations in the United States; however, the rest of the world is moving
forward with attempts (such as the Paris Agreement) to find solutions to
mitigate future climate impacts. 159 The question is no longer whether such
external pressures from climate and environmental regulations should be
applied to agriculture; rather, it is when these pressures will be applied to
agriculture and how. If agriculture is unwilling to take a proactive seat at
the table when the United States begins to implement similar climate
regulations, it is unlikely that the application of such regulations will be
favorably applied to the industry.
2. Congressional Amendments to CERCLA and EPCRA
This route attempts to revert the regulatory situation back to the status
quo and is the easiest in terms of actual management practices at CAFOs.
TEXAS, 10TH ANNUAL JOHN HUFFAKER AGRICULTURAL LAW COURSE 7 (2016) (stating that agriculture
exemptions are continuing to be eroded “by pressure from a number of sectors” and discussing the
Waterkeeper case).
156.
See Waterkeeper All. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 853 F.3d 527, 536 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(discussing that public comments on the Final Rule issued by the EPA undercut the EPA’s justification
for exempting farms from reporting emissions).
157.
Ferrell & Lashmet, supra note 155, at 7. (discussing how EPCRA was not designed to
regulate byproduct emission from livestock operations and that agriculture should take a proactive
approach to assist in finding a “right tool for the job”).
158.
See EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2015,
supra note 56, at ES-6 (identifying enteric fermentation, natural gas systems, landfills, and manure
management as the top four sources of methane).
159.
See Philip Rucker & Jenna Johnson, Trump Announces U.S. Will Exit Paris Climate
Deal, Sparking Criticism at Home and Abroad, WASH. POST (June 1, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-announce-us-will-exit-paris-climatedeal/2017/06/01/fbcb0196-46da-11e7-bcde-624ad94170ab_story.html [https://perma.cc/8L64-3KAN]
(discussing how pulling out from the Paris Climate Agreement will take four years—slightly longer than
President Trump’s first term).
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This option is the one that eventually took the prize (for now), as the
Omnibus Bill exempts CAFOs from reporting “air emissions from animal
waste at a farm.” 160 However, this was never a guaranteed option. On at
least two occasions (2004 and 2017), dozens of Senators wrote to the EPA
Administrator either to ask the Agency to clarify the reporting requirements
of CERCLA and EPCRA or to limit the reporting requirements under these
two laws for livestock and poultry operations. 161 These letters demonstrate
that Congress is aware that livestock producers face uncertainty and may be
targeted for enforcement actions under these laws.162 However, asking the
executive branch to find a way to lessen the regulatory burden of
Congress’s legislation on the agriculture industry, especially in the
aftermath of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Waterkeeper Alliance, is an
unlikely strategy to create real change. The EPA is only given so much
deference by the courts, and the second highest court in the land struck
down the EPA’s actions to create an exception in its 2008 rule. 163
Nevertheless, the Senators are not limited to writing letters if they truly
want to provide relief to the agriculture industry under these regulations. In
2011, both the House and the Senate introduced bills that would amend
CERCLA in order “to clarify that manure is not considered a hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant under the Act.” 164 The amendments
failed to gain the needed traction.165 However, if Congress would like to see
CAFOs exempt from CERCLA and EPCRA reporting requirements, it will
have to, again, attempt to amend and exclude animal production facilities
from these reporting requirements. 166 Congress clearly knew how to exempt
certain items under CERCLA and EPCRA as demonstrated by the fertilizer
exclusion, which exempts “the normal application of fertilizer” from the
definition of release. 167 With the FARM Act’s inclusion within the
Omnibus Bill, this exemption has been expanded to also apply to animal
waste as well.
160.
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https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2997/details [https://perma.cc/VWL8-QXAK] (last visited
Mar. 19, 2018) (explaining that no vote on the bill ever took place).
166.
See Sierra Club v. Tyson Foods, F. Supp. 2d 693, 705–06 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (explaining
that courts interpret the fact that animal production facilities are not excluded from regulations as
evidence that Congress did not intent to exclude such facilities).
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Congress is making a similar push to exempt animal waste from the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), an act that governs the
treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste. 168 While
unsuccessful, the Farm Regulatory Certainty Act was introduced in the U.S.
House in 2016 to amend RCRA to clarify that RCRA does not “govern
animal waste, manure, or fertilizer, or constituents derived from such
sources, or the ways in which they are managed, stored, handled, or applied
by agricultural operations.” 169 As the Omnibus Bill demonstrates,
congressional amendments to these statutes will tremendously reduce the
regulatory burden on agriculture.
3. A Proactive Approach by the Agriculture Industry
Today’s modern agriculture is more innovative and efficient than ever,
even as the demand for its products and outside pressures continue to
increase. 170 The American farmer and rancher does more with less today
than ever before, and it is this type of spirit and drive that may be the
answer to helping find solutions to emissions problems from animal
agriculture. 171 Rather than continuing to play defense against environmental
groups or waiting for the legislature to amend laws in order to provide
preferential exemptions, production agriculture can take “the bull by the
horns” and proactively work with the EPA to find solutions for its
emissions. Such voluntary efforts by animal agriculture to define for itself
the best ways to manage and regulate emissions will likely be more industry
friendly and feasible than any rule created through litigation with the Sierra
Club or the Animal Legal Defense Fund. While a lofty goal, the Air
Compliance Agreement is an example of previous cooperation in this
area. 172
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Cooperative efforts will require the development of best management
practices to help manage and mitigate emissions, and they may take on
several different forms and vary industry by industry within production
agriculture. Some of these best management practices can be split into
either “pre-excretion strategies” or “post-excretion strategies.” 173 Preexcretion strategies can include diet manipulation where the use of feed
additives and accurate feeding of dietary protein and amino acids (as well
as sulfur) can be used to minimize the amount of nitrogen and sulfur (and
thus ammonia and hydrogen sulfide) that may end up in urine and
manure. 174 For instance, modification of the diet of feedlot cattle, through
altering diet digestibility or the inclusion of additives, can change ammonia
and methane emissions by 20-50%. 175
Post-excretion strategies focus on ways to manage and treat the manure
in order to minimize emissions. 176 For example, application of chemicals to
manure may help reduce the amount of ammonia that is released. 177
Furthermore, covering the facilities that store manure may help minimize
the amount of ammonia released, and the use of more dry storage
techniques, compared with wet storage, may reduce the amount of
hydrogen sulfide released. 178 For facilities that house livestock and poultry
inside, ventilation systems can be equipped with filters or treatment systems
that may capture emissions from being released into the air outside the
building. 179 Compared with surface manure application, sub-surface manure
application with injectors has been shown to limit ammonia losses. 180
Finally, as the technology improves and becomes more economical,
anaerobic digesters may prove to be the most promising solution for
reducing emissions. Anaerobic digesters are closed systems that utilize an
anaerobic process to break down animal waste to produce biogas, which
can then be used to fuel the system. 181 This system can help reduce odors
and emissions of GHGs, ammonia, and hydrogen sulfide while providing a
CAFO a source of renewable energy. 182
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CONCLUSION
America’s modern animal agriculture is no longer the industry it was 50
years ago. It is more advanced, more confined, and more efficient than ever
while continuing to provide the safest and most affordable source of quality
protein for the world to enjoy. However, these advancements have not
remained unnoticed by environmental groups, which have established a
desire to end the preferential treatment under federal environmental
regulations from which production agriculture benefits. While most of this
regulation has dealt with water quality, Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA
demonstrates that courts will not provide an exemption for air emissions for
animal agriculture unless Congress creates one. Livestock and poultry
operations may argue that CERCLA and EPCRA were never intended to
apply to the air coming off rural farms and that the reporting requirements
from these operations are not useful in protecting the environment.
However, this position is a precarious one, as the same argument was made
unsuccessfully in applying the CAA to GHGs in Massachusetts v. EPA. 183
These arguments aside, production agriculture is at a crossroads.
Regulations are only going to increase in the coming years. Agriculture can
either choose to take a proactive approach to help find workable solutions
to these difficult issues, or it can continue to believe it is above the law and
watch idly from the sidelines as the courts and interest groups set these
regulations for it.
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